Purpose -This study focuses on corporate social responsibility and workplace wellbeing by examining Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) listed companies' labour disclosures. Design/methodology/approach -Year-ending 2007 and 2010 annual report disclosures of 31 IDX listed companies are analyzed. The widely acknowledged Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines are used as the disclosure index checklist. Findings -The results reveal that the overall labour disclosure level increases from 21.84% in 2007 to 30.52% in 2010. The levels of four of the five specific labour disclosures also increase with Employment being the exception. The results further show that the Indonesian government does not influence the increase in the levels of the overall labour disclosure or the four categories showing increased disclosure but, surprisingly, does significantly affect the decrease in the level of the Employment category. Research limitations/implications -It is implied that the government is at best ambiguous given that, on one side, the government regulates all corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and reporting but appears to coercively pressure companies to hide Employment specific issues. Practical implications -It is implied that Indonesian companies need to have 'strong and influential' independent commissioners on the boards to counter any possible pressures from the government resulting in lower disclosure levels. Originality/value -This paper provides insights into the 'journey' of labour-related CSR disclosure practices in Indonesia and contributes to the literature by testing one specific variant of isomorphic institutional theory namely coercive isomorphism.
Introduction
The Indonesian government has been formally regulating corporate social responsibility further strengthened, the regulations still do not specify the types of CSR disclosures that must be provided and thus it is still left largely to company discretion.
On the surface, CSR practices and reporting in Indonesia have consistently been improving evidenced by the findings in this paper, media articles (newspaper and the online website)
and recently published academic articles. During October 2011, for instance, Budiman (2011) notes that some companies such as Astra Toyota provided University scholarships to students in some Indonesian cities with some institutions also organizing CSR-related reporting awards to companies. The Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI) now awards points for companies participating in their Annual Report Award which provides CSR disclosure in line with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia, 2012) . Another annual report CSR disclosure award is conducted by the National Center for Sustainability
Reporting in this emerging country (National Center for Sustainability Reporting, 2011).
Indonesia itself is also now playing an important role in the global arena. The headquarters of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, is located in Jakarta, the (Saragih and Ririhena, 2012) . Indonesia is also an active member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as well as the Group of 20 (G20) (Pakpahan, 2012) . Unlike many countries which have suffered under the current global financial crisis, the Indonesian economy is booming with the economy continuing to grow at more than 6 % per annum (Allen, 2013) . A recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute even predicts that this developing nation will potentially become the world's seventh-biggest economy by 2030 (Allen, 2013 ).
The Indonesian private sector's contribution to the global market and competition continues to expand through opening foreign branches, having foreign subsidiaries, or exporting their products (Lecraw, 1993 , Hill, 2008 . The labour market continues to improve with employment rising annually by approximately 3.2% since 2006 (International Labour Organization, 2012) . Although Indonesia has benefited economically through globalisation, ironically, there are still complex social problems with evidence of continued violations in the workforce despite Indonesia's labour laws and ratification of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Core Conventions of labour rights. There remain huge numbers of work accidents, inequality of remuneration, age based discrimination, and child labour (see International Labour Organization, 2012). Caraway (2010) argues that while Indonesia appears to have a high compliance of labour standards with ILO conventions (88.6%), the actual practice is much lower (66.6%), with similar results for labour standards between law and in practice.
Incorporating Caraway's study, Stalling (2010, p. 136) , examined the de jure and de facto scores for labour flexibility and labour standards across four regions and posits that "all kinds 4 of labor rights are greater on paper than in reality because of lack of enforcement". This is further reinforced with evidence from Indonesia showing that workers are often employed without any clear contracts, required to work very long hours without enough pay, or fired without any clear reasons (Sprague, 2009; Hadiprayitno, 2010 ) and there appears to be little recourse under the controversial Manpower Act No. 13/2003 or through the fragmented and relatively weak Indonesian Unions (Collins et al., 2011) . This is particularly relevant to domestic workers, who largely "fall outside formal regulatory systems … [and are] regulated by trust alone" (International Labour Organization, 2006, p. 7) . There is also a huge difference in the amount of salary between employees in high and low level positions. In the Indonesian finance industry, for example, the minimum salary for an accounts clerk is 2,000,000 Rupiah/month whereas the minimum salary for a finance manager is ten times higher at 20,000,000 Rupiah/month 4 (Kelly Services, 2009) . Such a gap places workers in a far weaker position vis á vis the companies (Indonesia Labour Foundation, 2008) .
Theoretically, employees are critical components of CSR and the relationship between employees and their employers is deemed as a key precondition of CSR (Johnston, 2001 ).
However, the continued existence of labour-related problems indicates that Indonesian companies do not undertake labour-related programs as part of their CSR. Instead, they focus on donations and 'green' actions ostensibly to mislead stakeholders or to build a good corporate image (see Budiman, 2011) . A previous study on labour-related CSR reporting by Cahaya et al., (2012) shows that the level of Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures (LPDWD) in 2007 in Indonesia is low. Given that there seems to be an improvement of CSR reporting practices since the issuance of CSR-related regulations it is considered important to examine the 'journey' of the level of LPDWD in the last couple of years. This paper focuses on the disclosure of labour standards and labour flexibility in Indonesia. Specifically, this 5 paper aims to examine the extent of change in the level of Indonesian listed companies' labour disclosures over time and the Indonesian government's influence on the changes in the extent of those disclosures.
This study is important for several reasons. Firstly, it provides insights into the labour-related CSR disclosure practices in a developing country. As reviewed by Stalling (2010, p. 132) studies on labour standards and labour flexibility have focused on "labor market characteristics", specific labour issues and methodological issues and "labor market policies in developing countries". There has been little research on company disclosures of labour issues in developing countries with most previous studies on CSR reporting focusing on the whole set of CSR disclosure components encompassing the environment, human rights, society, and product responsibility (see for example Islam and Deegan, 2010; Othman et al., 2011) . Other studies have examined employees as one element of intellectual capital (see for example White et al., 2010; Farooq and Nielsen, 2014) , however, the Indonesian government consider employees under their regulations on CSR and this is supported by who argue that workers themselves feature in the mainstream definitions and criteria of CSR. This study is also important as it analyzes the changes in the levels of LPDWD over Lastly, it contributes to the social accounting literature by testing one specific variant of institutional theory, which is coercive isomorphism. Institutional theory is concerned with how organizations structure themselves to gain acceptance and legitimacy with organizations becoming 'isomorphic' in an attempt to achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) .
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Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted by other organizations … as well as cultural expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.149) and in the context of this study represents the formal pressure of the Indonesian government on listed companies to disclose labour practices. Arguably, such a test can provide deeper insights into the potential pressures of powerful stakeholder groups in this emerging country.
In particular, by adopting institutional theory, this study captures the institutional process by which LPDWD adapts and changes in Indonesian companies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the study, including the importance of the study. Section 2 reviews previous literature and discusses the theoretical framework. The research methodology is presented in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the statistical results. This is followed by Section 5 which discusses the results, the implications, and the conclusions of the results.
Literature review and theoretical framework
Before the 1990s, the emphasis of labour reporting studies (e.g. Pound, 1980; Webb and Taylor, 1980; Craig and Hussey, 1982) focused mainly on the provision of reports by companies to their employees, not on companies' official annual reports. The reports contain information about the companies themselves such as references to organization objectives, simplified balance sheets, and data about shareholders (Webb and Taylor, 1980) . Such reports, which are actually not common in Indonesia, are labeled as employee reports (Guthrie and Mathews, 1985) .
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Most papers in the current social accounting literature do not focus on labour-related disclosures but instead deal with a whole set of social or environmental disclosure issues, including specific issues of carbon and climate change (see for example Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006; Bebbington and Larrinaga-González, 2008; Kolk et al., 2008; Othman et al., 2011) . However, this paper notes four important recent research papers which look at disclosures of companies' policies on employees. These studies include Brown, Tower, and Alvarez (2007) Nielsen, 1014). Arguably, the categorization between IC disclosure and labour-related CSR disclosure is complex and overlapping. This is evidenced by the fact that some of the disclosure items within the two are similar (see for example training and employee safety in Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Abeysekera, 2007) . Vuontisjärvi (2006) , however, points out that IC disclosure and labour-related CSR disclosure (which is labeled as Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures (LPDWD) in this paper) are essentially different. IC disclosure focuses on information about knowledge and skills of employees (intangible assets) and how these contribute to the performance of the organization whereas employee-related CSR disclosure focuses on information regarding the social impacts of companies' policies on employees (Vuontisjärvi, 2006) . This paper examines the latter concept (LPDWD) as this subset of CSR reporting is still under-researched.
This paper adopts one specific variant of isomorphic institutional theory namely coercive isomorphism as the underlying theoretical framework. Isomorphic institutional theory itself is the process by which an organization adapts to particular practices due to institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) , there are three isomorphic 'pressures' potentially undertaken by organizations in an attempt to achieve legitimacy, coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism.
Coercive isomorphism refers to a situation in which organizations adapt to an institutional practice (e.g. LPDWD practices) because of formal and informal pressures exerted by influential stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Mimetic isomorphism is a situation in which organizations copy other organizations' institutional practices for the purpose of legitimacy-related competitive advantages (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Normative isomorphism is a situation in which organizations adapt to particular practices due to pressures from group norms such as managers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . As this paper focuses on the influence of one influential stakeholder group namely the Indonesian government, it is considered appropriate to adopt coercive isomorphism as the underlying theoretical framework of the study.
The Indonesian government has been regulating CSR practices and reporting by listed companies since 2006 and therefore has a direct influence on company reporting. Due to additional government regulations, this paper, not surprisingly, posits that the level of LPDWD by Indonesian listed companies increases between 2007 and 2010. However, this study also predicts that the government has a coercive influence on the type of labour disclosures that companies do or do not report. There are three clear reasons for focusing the research on listed companies. Firstly, in the Indonesian economy, listed companies dominate and play an important role as well as gain considerable interest from key stakeholders such as investors and creditors (Nurhayati, 2005; Okuda and Take, 2005) . Secondly, the reporting practices of those companies are much more regulated than unlisted companies. This is because listed companies' reporting practices must comply with not only the general accounting regulations (accounting standard) but also IDX and Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan reporting regulations. Such a regulatory phenomenon indicates that listed companies produce more refined data than nonlisted companies do and provide a more comprehensive overview of the companies' profile (see Okuda and Take, 2005) . Thirdly, data for the listed companies is easier to obtain as listed entities' annual reports can be accessed directly from the IDX's website.
Research methodology
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Although other CSR research has used separate stand-alone sustainability reports as the source of disclosure data, this medium is not uniformly used by most companies in Indonesia (see Baker and Naser, 2000; Chambers et al., 2003) . Although there is a growing number of companies in this developing country producing stand-alone sustainability reports the number is still small 9 (see Jayaningrat, 2012) and less disclosure information would be available from these limited reports than that available in companies' annual reports.
This paper employs a disclosure index to measure the dependent variable, which is the extent of labour disclosure. It has been noted in a number of studies that a disclosure index is a more suitable technique to be used for measuring the level of disclosure in developing nations (see for example Brown et al., 2005; Nurhayati, Brown and Tower, 2006) . This is because the economic, political and social conditions in those nations are very different from those of developed nations (Brown, Tower and Taplin, 2004) . The index also avoids penalizing companies for a non-disclosed item when it is not relevant to them (Cooke, 1991; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995) and is considered objective 10 . Moreover, a disclosure index arguably enables researchers to best gain insight into the level of information disclosed by companies (Cooke and Wallace, 1989; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995) . This is because this measurement approach can capture pictures and graphics, which are potentially powerful and highly effective methods of communication (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . As such, it is considered suitable to employ a disclosure index in this paper.
In a disclosure index, the contents of each annual report are compared to the items listed on a benchmark checklist and coded as 1 or 0, depending upon whether or not the content conforms to the items listed on the checklist (Meek et al., 1995) . The benchmark checklist can be generated based on checklists employed in earlier studies using particular accounting 13 and reporting standards, guidelines, regulations, and discussions with practitioners and experts (Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995) . A disclosure index for every company is then calculated as the ratio of total score awarded to the company divided by the maximum number 11 of items that are applicable to the entity (Meek et al., 1995) . As such, the level of disclosure is treated as a continuous variable when it is measured by a disclosure index. To minimize subjectivity, the employed index is unweighted. Each disclosure item in the checklist is therefore deemed equally important to all sample companies. GRI performance indicators are considered one of the most widely accepted international reporting guidelines (Adams, 2004; Fraser, 2005; Moneva, Archel and Correa, 2006; Crane, Matten and Spence, 2008 Prior CSR reporting studies in Indonesia suggest that these guidelines are appropriate to be used in an Indonesian context (see for example Suhardjanto, Tower and Brown, 2008a; Suhardjanto, Tower and Brown, 2008b) . Research has indicated that as there are no clearly detailed CSR guidelines from the Indonesian government or from the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI), that a number of Indonesian companies adopt the GRI guidelines (Lako, 2011; Jalal, 2012) . GRI guidelines themselves are currently deemed as the best sustainability guidelines in Indonesia as they offer a comprehensive benchmark for corporations (Lako, 2011; Jalal, 2012) . Importantly, in relation to labour disclosures, GRI LPDWD indicators have been developed based on internationally recognized standards including ILO's standards (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013) . This paper therefore adopts GRI performance indicators as the benchmark disclosure checklist.
GRI Labour Practices and Decent
As this study focuses exclusively on the changes in the labour disclosure level over time and Amran and Devi, 2008; Isack and Tan, 2008) . This paper adopts the former because, in Indonesia, government ownership often does not exist in every company (see Adnan and Nankervis, 2003; Cahaya et al., 2012) .
Having presented the sample, the data collection, the period of examination, and the measurement techniques, the following section reports the results of the statistical data analysis. To answer the research questions, this paper uses descriptive statistics and t-test 16 . (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia, 2008; Jakarta Globe, 2013) .
Statistical results
A closer analysis on the disclosure by companies for each LPDWD items is presented in is to avoid communicating sensitive contract employment issue. Through such an avoiding strategy, the management of the companies possibly assume that they can avoid the potential conflict with some stakeholder groups such as labour unions.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
One explanation for the decrease in the number of companies disclosing LA9 is that Where agreements still exist between companies and trade unions, the items within those agreements are not detailed or are not broken down into specific health and safety topics.
Instead, the points that the companies and trade unions agree are presented or written in a general topic such as the agreement about companies' overall health and safety program with an emphasis on a statement of the rights and the obligations of the management of companies as well as the rights and the obligations of the labour unions in that program.
Surprisingly, the t-test results show that there are no significant government influences on the increase in the level of overall LPDWD and all LPDWD specific categories, except for Employment specific disclosures. As shown in Table 3 , government ownership does significantly influence the changes in the level of Employment specific disclosures over time but does not significantly influence the changes in the overall LPDWD and the other specific categories. Interestingly, the significant association between government ownership and the disclosure or Employment specific category shows a negative relationship, as confirmed by the value of Spearman Correlation coefficient -0.482. One explanation is that the Indonesian government coercively press companies to reduce the level of Employment specific disclosure. The detailed discussion on this finding is presented in the next section.
[Insert Table 3 Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, from 45% in 1997 to 38% in 1999 (Brown et al., 2005) , the trend of LPDWD in Indonesia appears to be increasing, but remains relatively low. It may be that companies in Indonesia are in the process of 'learning' how to be good 'citizens' in this developing nation's business environment. In particular, it seems that those companies appear to be understanding how to socially 'treat' their employees and communicate this in their annual reports. Alternatively, there may be other influences, which
have not been tested in this study, and therefore it can only be speculated that the overall growth in LPWD disclosures is a combination of Indonesia's strengthening labour laws and external influences such as the application of SA8000 19 by many Indonesian companies
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(Aspiring Innovative Management Services, 2013) , ratification of the ILO core labour conventions and increased economic globalisation (Caraway, 2010) .
Another explanation for the increasing trend in LPWD disclosures may be tied in with the decreased disclosure of the Employment specific category. This category is significantly impacted by the Indonesian government but in a negative direction. This result highlights that the Indonesian government, as one of the influential stakeholder groups, may be coercively The findings indicate that the Indonesian government weakens the position and the future of Indonesian workers by supporting companies to continue using and increasing the number of contracted workers. While companies may be voluntarily not disclosing Employment specific issues in an effort to disguise the nature of labour contracts and to avoid potential conflict, the significant government ownership may also imply tacit agreement from the government to 'turn a blind eye' to the lack of disclosure on this issue, or at the very least that the government is ambiguous.
The findings of this research support Collins et al. (2011, p. 372) argument that globalisation and a "less powerful government in terms of political and economic interventions" are major factors in challenges facing Indonesian workers. Further research needs to be undertaken on whether the government does in fact support or even motivates companies to not disclose information regarding outsourced workers in their annual reports, or on whether this is a company decision and to determine their motivations for doing so, or if there are other outside influences on the content and reporting levels of LPDWD. The results of this study can therefore be used as the start of a more detailed investigation on the reasons why more extensive reporting is not undertaken in Indonesia.
An important implication of the above results is that independent commissioners need to use their authority and power within the corporate governance structure for pushing companies to consistently undertake good labour-related CSR activities and communicate these activities in 23 annual reports. This need is considered critical due to the apparent ambiguity of the government, which results in low levels of disclosure and the decreasing level of Employment disclosures. In addition, companies with significant government ownership need to have 'strong' independent commissioners on the board to counter any pressures from the government to hide Employment specific issues. This seems to be the most reasonable solution for companies to 'guarantee' continuous corporate transparency and the achievement of corporate sustainability.
A positive implication of the overall increase in labour disclosures is that companies potentially are improving workers' quality of life. A company, for instance, may have started providing a work safety program because the corporate commissioners push the company to provide such a program and disclose information regarding the establishment of that program in the annual report. The positive impact of the establishment of the safety program on workers is clear, as their safety at work is now well addressed by the company. However, there remains the possibility that increased labour-related CSR disclosures are simply 'window dressing' to make the company look good and give the appearance of conforming to CSR regulations. This, of course, is another aspect that requires further research.
As with all research, this study has limitations. Firstly, companies having a direct government ownership are considered as those having a proportion of government ownership. This is because Indonesian listed companies usually do not clearly provide information in their annual reports regarding whether they directly belong to the government or indirectly through government-owned enterprises. Secondly, the sample size in this research is relatively small. However, given that the differences in disclosures between the 2007 study (Cahaya et al, 2012) 
LA5
Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, including whether it is specified in collective agreements.
A.3. Occupational Health and Safety
LA6
Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint managementworker health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on occupational health and safety programs.
LA7
Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and number of work related fatalities by region.
LA8
Education, training, counseling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to assist workforce members, their families, or community members regarding serious diseases.
LA9
Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions.
A.4. Training and Education
LA10
Average hours of training per year per employee by employee category.
LA11
Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the continued employability of employees and assist them in managing career endings.
LA12
Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews.
A.5. Diversity and Equal Opportunity
LA13
Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per category according to gender, age group, minority group membership, and other indicators of diversity.
LA14
Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee category Source: Global Reporting Initiative (2006). Note: a). If an indicator has several subparts, a score of 1 will be awarded when any of the subparts is disclosed. This is due to the possible sparsity of information within the annual report. In LA1, for example, a score of 1 will be awarded if the company discloses any of the three subparts: total workforce by employment type, employment contract or region; b) LA3 is excluded from the disclosure index checklist of this study because, under PSAK No. 24, this item is considered as a mandatory item. Accordingly, in the statistical analysis, only thirteen items are used to measure LPDWD practices (refer Section 3). 
